Da bi delo utemeljilo resnično samozavedanje, mora temeljiti na zavesti, ki sem jo zgoraj imenoval 'zavest zmožnosti', in ki bi imela »oblast nad občim in moč nad vsem predmetnim bistvom« (str. 109, 203). Hegel to svobodo zmožnosti razvije na način, da pri formiranju podčrta odpravljanje dane bivajoče forme. »Toda ta predmetni negativum je ravno tisto tuje bitje, pred katerim je trepetala« (str. 108, 203). 

Hegel goes on to rapidly expose it as a self-indulging, stultifying fantasy. For first, while the concept of recognition demands reciprocal equality, master is recognized by the servant only, that is by someone she does not recognize herself. “As a result the recognition that has arisen is one-sided and unequal” – which is to say, it is no recognition. And second, since the other consciousness is the place where the first one obtains its objective existence, or its truth, it follows that by denigrating the servant it is itself that it has inflicted the damage to. 

The master seems to believe that in her person the problem of selfconsciousness has been resolved, that she is not only “the concept” of being-for-itself, but exists for herself as “mediated through another consciousness” (§190). She has seemingly established a stable relation to both the thing and the other self-consciousness. Having proved to be “self-standing”, she rules over the servant; for according to her it is the latter’s attachment to being that holds her in bondage: “it is the chain which the servant could not break free from in the struggle” (§190). 

In this experience self-consciousness learns that life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness. (§189)
This is crucial. According to Hegel, the struggle for death does not leaddirectly to the shape of master and servant. At first, the immediate self-consciousness rather sticks exclusively to its “pure being-for-itself”, and since to that effect it has nothing to lose, it can experience no fear and can only persist in fighting. Only the dull counting of futile deaths makesthe survivors understand that there is more in self-consciousness. 

In this experience self-consciousness learns that life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness. (§189)

Hegel boj na smrt vpelje takole:

"To gibanje samozavedanja v odnosu do drugega samozavedanja pa je bilo predstavljeno na (prav) ta način, kot početje enega; toda to početje enega ima po sebi podvojeni pomen, da je njegovo početje tudi početje drugega; (to) drugo je namreč prav tako samostojno, v sebi sklenjeno, in v njem ni ničesar, kar ni po sebi."

In the preceding considerations, Hegel the philosopher simply analysed the concept of recognitionm delineating the list od necessary conditions that have to be met in ordertthat a successful recognition could happen it is only "now" that we proceed to the level of experience. The concrete shape the natural consciousness takes "at first" is that of two self-conscious individuals which immediately "exist for themselves in the way orfdinary objects do", as "independent shpes absoorbed in the being of life".

In sedaj je jasno, da vse to velja le v popolni vzajemnosti. Pomislimo na trivialno obliko pripoznanja, pozdrav. »Vsaktero vidi drugo početi isto, kar počne samo, vskatero počne samo tisto, kar terja od drugega, in zato počne, kar počne, tudi le tolikanj, kolikor drugo počne isto; enostransko početje bi bilo brez haska …« (str. 104, 189) V resnici ne bi bilo brez haska, temveč smrtonosno za lastno samozavedanje. 

The relation of desire has been transformed into what Hegel – once again after Fichte – calls recognition: “Self-consciousness exists only in being recognized.” (§178) The fact that what used to be the object of desire has now become the self-conscious subject in its own merit, and in addition, that this other has become an integral part of the unity of the first, renders the situations infinitely complex indeed.